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This article begins by first focusing on the Tokyo IMT’s heritage of 
collective forgetting in relation to instances of systematized violence 
against women, especially the establishment of comfort stations in 
territories formerly occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army.  In specific, 
after the Introduction, it describes the international political, legal and 
military factors that led to the formation of the Tokyo IMT; a brief 
overview of the trial; the political and pedagogical functions of the Tokyo 
IMT; and legal and extra-legal devices of the Tokyo IMT.  Subsequently, it 
points out key differences between the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, in 
terms of their legal and political strategies and aims.  From there, it 
analyzes the Tokyo IMT’s legacy of forgetting crimes of violence against 
women, especially the crimes against the comfort women, which included 
a collusion of amnesia imposed by the Allied powers with the Japanese 
Imperial government, through the exploitation of various legal loopholes 
in international law.  From there, it moves from the Tokyo IMT’s specific 
history to a broader analysis of the functions of crimes of violence against 
women during wartime conditions in the twentieth century and why such 
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crimes, for the most part, have been invisible.  To close, the article 
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of various ways in which women 
suffering such wartime crimes of violence, inclusive of the comfort women, 
may seek redress for such crimes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
[I]f the dead from [the Rape of] Nanking were to link 
hands, they would stretch from Nanking to the city of 
Hanchow, spanning a distance of some two hundred miles.  
Their blood would weigh twelve hundred tons, and their 
bodies would fill twenty-five hundred railroad cars.  
2011]  BEYOND FORGETTING: THE LEGACY OF THE TOKYO IMT         3      
 
Stacked on top of each other, these bodies would reach the 
height of a seventy-four-story building.1 
 
There is no dearth of images representing the Holocaust; in fact, images 
from the Holocaust have become so ubiquitous that they have achieved 
the status of a form of visual rhetoric—a call to action against gross 
human rights violations.2  Unlike the Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg IMT), which has been iconized and epideictically 
represented through Hollywood movies3 and television mini-series,4 the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter, the Tokyo 
IMT) has left comparatively few traces, both in historical and legal texts,5 
and in popular culture. 
Marita Sturken remarks: 
The process of history making is highly complex, one that 
takes place in the United States through a variety of 
cultural arenas, including the media, Hollywood narrative 
films, and museums in addition to the academy.  That 
means that memories, artifacts, images and events often 
get marked as historical without the aid of historians.6 
 
Even “historical” films that have the “look” of “authenticity,” such as 
Spielberg’s Schindler’s List, 7  appropriate narrative techniques derived 
from horror such as Hitchcock’s “shower scene” from Psycho, 8  and 
exploit the stock characters of the hyperfeminized, vulnerable Jewess and 
the hypermasculinized monstrous Nazi male officer. 9   Such 
“commodification of suffering”10 may be understood as a part of the 
                                                 
1 IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING 5 (1997). 
2 For example, Richard Raskin tracks the image of the Jewish child held at gunpoint by 
Nazi soldiers from its historical context to its incorporation into a number of works of art 
and appropriation into the “war of images” in the Middle East.  See RICHARD RASKIN, A 
CHILD AT GUNPOINT:  A CASE STUDY IN THE LIFE OF A PHOTO (2004). 
3 JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (Roxlom Films Inc. 1963). 
4 NUREMBERG (Alliance Atlantis Commc’ns et al. 2000). 
5 See, e.g., RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR’S JUSTICE (reprt. 2001) (1971); B.V.A. RÖLING, 
THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND (Antonio Cassese ed., 1993). 
6 Marita Sturken, Absent Images of Memory:  Remembering and Reenacting the Japanese 
Internment, in PERILOUS MEMORIES 33–34 (T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White & Lisa 
Yoneyama eds., 2001). 
7 Schindler’s List (Universal Pictures, et. al., 1993). 
8 Psycho (Shamley Productions, et. al., 1960). 
9 CAROLINE JOAN (KAY) S. PICART & DAVID A. FRANK, FRAMES OF EVIL:  THE HOLOCAUST 
AS HORROR IN AMERICAN FILM 36–69 (2006).  
10 “[T]he cultural capital of trauma victims—their wounds, their scars, their tragedy—is 
appropriated by the same popular codes through which physical and sexual violence is 
commodified, sold in the cinema, marketed as pornography, and used by tabloids and 
novelists to attract readers.”  Arthur Kleinman & Joan Kleinman, The Appeal of 
4 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
complex, non-linear process of collectively attempting to “work 
through,”11 or come to terms with, the trauma of the Holocaust.  Yet when 
traces of memory have been suppressed, as if in a collectively agreed-
upon amnesia, as they have been, in the case of the Tokyo IMT,12 it is 
more difficult to work through that trauma.  This is an attempt to work 
through the legacy of the Tokyo IMT, which has usually been either 
conflated with, or dismissed as simply corollary to, the Nuremberg IMT—
a mistake that has far-reaching consequences, both legally and politically. 
This article begins by first focusing on the Tokyo IMT’s heritage 
of collective forgetting in relation to instances of systematized violence 
against women, especially the establishment of comfort stations in 
territories formerly occupied by the Imperial Japanese Army.  In specific, 
after the Introduction, Part II describes the international political, legal and 
military factors that led to the formation of the Tokyo IMT; a brief 
overview of the trial; the political and pedagogical functions of the Tokyo 
IMT; and legal and extra-legal devices of the Tokyo IMT.  Subsequently, 
Part III points out key differences between the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Trials, in terms of their legal and political strategies and aims.  Finally, 
Part IV analyzes the Tokyo IMT’s legacy of forgetting crimes of violence 
against women, especially the crimes against the comfort women, which 
included a collusion of amnesia imposed by the Allied powers with the 
Japanese Imperial government, through the exploitation of various legal 
loopholes in international law.  From there, Parts V and VI move from the 
Tokyo IMT’s specific history to a broader analysis of the functions of 
crimes of violence against women during wartime conditions in the 
twentieth century, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, 
and contemplate why such crimes, for the most part, have been not only 
difficult to prosecute, but have remained invisible.  To close, the article 
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of various ways in which such 
wartime crimes of violence against women, inclusive of the case of the 
comfort women, may seek redress.  Though the case of the comfort 
women has remained without a legal solution, there have been successes 
in the cases of Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone that 
could suggest useful strategies for litigating institutionalized sexual 
                                                                                                               
Experience; The Dismay of Images:  Cultural Appropriations of Suffering in Our Times in 
SOCIAL SUFFERING 10–11 (Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das & Margaret Lock eds., 1997). 
11 “Working-through implies the possibility of judgment that is not apodictic or ad 
hominem but argumentative, self-questioning, and related in mediated ways to action.  In 
this sense, it is bound up with the role of distinctions that are not purely binary oppositions 
but marked by varying and contestable degrees of strength or weakness.”  DOMINICK 
LACAPRA, REPRESENTING THE HOLOCAUST:  HISTORY, THEORY, TRAUMA 210 (1994). 
12 The imagery of absence or forgetting is ubiquitous in relation to the Tokyo IMT:  “[T]he 
proceedings in Tokyo have become an all but forgotten chapter in the history of 
interpreting.”  KAYOKO TAKEDA, INTERPRETING THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 8 (2010). 
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slavery and other crimes of violence against women during wartime 
conditions. 
II. THE NATURE OF THE TOKYO IMT 
A. The Road to Prosecution and a Jurisdictional Postscript 
As World War II drew to a close, on July 26, 1945, the United 
States, the United Kingdom and China met and issued the Potsdam 
Declaration regarding the terms of Japanese surrender.13  Much like the 
Agreement and Charter which authorized the Nuremberg IMT (hereinafter, 
collectively, the “Nuremberg Charter”), with their heavy didactic 
emphasis,14 the Potsdam Declaration declared that “stern justice” was to 
be “meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited 
cruelties upon . . . prisoners.”15  As with the Nuremberg IMT, the legal 
basis for the Tokyo IMT was military.  After the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9, Emperor Hirohito’s 
surrender was announced on August 15; but the official ending of wartime 
hostilities came only when representatives of the Japanese government 
signed the Instrument of Surrender on board the USS Missouri in Tokyo 
Bay on September 2, 1945.16  Simultaneously, the Instrument of Surrender 
subjected the Emperor and the Japanese government to the authority of the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan—U.S. General 
Douglas MacArthur—who essentially shaped policy in relation to 
procedures regarding war crimes prosecutions and the occupation of 
Japan.17  Japan’s occupation began when General MacArthur arrived on 
August 30, 1945.18 
On September 11, 1945, MacArthur authorized the arrests of 
thirty nine prominent war crimes suspects, including the former Prime 
Minister and War Minister, General Hideki Tōjō.19  Within several months, 
approximately one hundred individuals had been detained at the Sugamo 
prison in Tokyo20 as suspected “Class-A war criminals,”21 or “major war 
                                                 
13 Id. at 10. 
14 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 472 E.A.S. 1, 1, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 280 (“[T]hose German 
Officers . . . who have been responsible for . . . atrocities and crimes will be sent back to 
the countries in which their abominable deeds were done . . . .”). 
15 Proclamation of Terms for Japanese Surrender (Potsdam Declaration), ¶ 10, July 26, 
1945, 3 Bevans 1204, 1205 (1968). 
16 TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 10. 
17 MADOKA FUTAMURA, WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 52 (2008). 
18 Id. 
19 TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 11. 
20 Id. 
21 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53. 
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criminals” 22  for committing “crimes against peace.” 23   The Tokyo 
Tribunal was created based on the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter, the “Tokyo Charter”), which was 
issued on January 19, 1946;24 the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East was modeled on the Nuremberg Charter, and 
included prosecution for crimes against peace, conventional war crimes 
and crimes against humanity as its jurisdictional grounds.25 
Although the Nuremberg Charter had already been announced on 
August 8, the Tokyo Charter took months to develop.  In the meantime, 
President Harry S. Truman appointed Joseph Keenan, formerly the leader 
of the U.S. Justice Department’s criminal division, as the chief prosecutor 
for the Tokyo Trial.26  Keenan arrived in Japan on December 6, 1945, 
accompanied by an army of forty lawyers and aides.27  In considerable 
contrast with Nuremberg, where the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Soviet Union each sent its own prosecution team, here 
there was simply one consolidated team led by Keenan, incorporating 
representatives from the eleven Allied countries.28  On December 8, 1945, 
the fourth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor according to the 
Japanese calendar, the International Prosecution Section was established.29  
It was only after the International Prosecution Section was in place that 
the Tokyo Charter was established, drafted by the U.S. prosecution team, 
and approved and announced by MacArthur.30  The Tokyo Charter was 
later amended through consultations with the other Allied countries.31 
With the Tokyo Charter officially in place, each of the nine 
signatories to the Japanese Instrument of Surrender nominated a judge, but 
it was General MacArthur who appointed these judges on February 15, 
1946.32  The tribunal was comprised of eleven judges:  one from each of 
the Instrument’s nine signatories (Australia, Canada, China, France, Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Soviet Union and the United 
States) and, after MacArthur amended the Tokyo Charter on April 26, 
1946 in response to a call from the Far Eastern Commission, the Allied 
Powers’ highest policy-making agency for the occupation of Japan,33 India 
and the Philippines, each of which were also represented in the 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 11. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 12. 
33 Id. 
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prosecution.34  Although Sir William Webb, the Australian judge, was 
vulnerable to charges of bias based on his prior position as the chief 
investigator for atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army 
against Australian prisoners of war, he became the President of the 
Tribunal, and remained in that post for the duration of the trial.35 
In March, 1946, selections of the accused began, and on April 29, 
1946, indictments were issued for twenty eight defendants.36  Among 
these were former general and Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō and seventeen 
other military officers.37  Four of the defendants were former prime 
ministers, and most of the rest had been members of wartime cabinets.38 
Seven of the accused, at the end of the trial, filed motions with the 
U.S. Supreme Court for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus.39  
In terms of jurisdiction, the petitioners claimed that the Tokyo Tribunal 
was a U.S. military tribunal over which the U.S. Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction, and that the U.S. executive branch had overstepped its 
boundaries by establishing a court and legislating crimes—something the 
U.S. Constitution reserved for Congress.40  The petitioners claimed that an 
unauthorized crime was being prosecuted through an unauthorized 
procedure, which would thus give the U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction to 
grant habeas corpus.41  They also argued that there was no treaty basis for 
the Tokyo Tribunal.42  These arguments were dismissed by the Supreme 
Court, as stated in full below: 
 
We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these 
petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States.  The 
United States and other allied countries conquered and 
now occupy and control Japan.  General Douglas 
MacArthur has been selected and is acting as the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers.  The military tribunal 
sentencing these petitioners has been set up by General 
MacArthur as the agent of the Allied Powers.  Under the 
foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States 
                                                 
34 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53. 
35 TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 12. 
36 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Hirota v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 876–81 (1948) (agreeing to hear arguments).  The seven 
petitioners were Hirota, Dohihara, Kido, Oka, Sato, Shimada, and Togo. 
40 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o constitute Tribunals 
inferior to the supreme Court.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER, 
THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 29 (2008). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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have no power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside 
or annul the judgments and sentences imposed on these 
petitioners and for this reason the motions for leave to file 
petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.43 
  
 Justice Douglas, although he concurred, expressed some 
cautionary thoughts regarding setting a precedent of refusing to exercise 
extra-territorial jurisdiction over the Tokyo IMT because it left no basis 
for judicial scrutiny of this type of tribunal, essentially giving the Tokyo 
IMT absolute power.44  Douglas stated that prisoners under the Tokyo 
IMT’s mandates had no recourse for appeal, and doubted that his 
colleagues would have affirmed such a state of affairs had the prisoners 
been U.S. citizens.45  Nevertheless, the majority clearly agreed with the 
Tokyo IMT, which stated in its judgment that “[t]he Tribunal was 
established in virtue of and to implement the Cairo Declaration of the 1st 
of December 1943, the Declaration of Potsdam of the 26th of July 1945, 
the Instrument of Surrender of the 2nd of December 1945, and the 
Moscow Conference of the 26th of December 1945.” 46   Whatever 
controversies arose regarding the validity of the Tokyo IMT as an 
international tribunal, what is clear is that the chief justification for its 
existence is found in Paragraph 10 of the Potsdam Declaration; it is this 
item as well that ironically paves the way for the eventual “forgetting” of 
many of Japan’s WWII atrocities during the Cold War realignment of 
powers.  Stated in full, Paragraph 10 of the Potsdam Declaration reads as 
follows: 
 
We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a 
race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be 
meted out to all war criminals, including those who have 
visited cruelties upon our prisoners.  The Japanese 
Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and 
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the 
Japanese people.  Freedom of speech,  of religion, and of 
thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human 
rights shall be established.47 
 
 
                                                 
43 Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948). 
44 Id. at 205. 
45 Id. 
46 BOISTER & CRYER, supra note 40, at 31. 
47 Proclamation of Terms for Japanese Surrender (Potsdam Declaration), ¶ 10, July 26, 
1945, 3 Bevans 1204, 1205 (1968). 
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B. The Trial: A Brief Overview 
On April 29, 1946, twenty eight “Class A” defendants, all of 
whom had been Japanese military and political leaders during WWII, 
were indicted of “crimes against peace (Class A),” “conventional crimes 
(Class B)” and “crimes against humanity (Class C).”48   In spite of 
reservations expressed by, for example, Australia, the Allied Powers 
ultimately agreed, as Paragraph 10 of the Potsdam Declaration had 
implied, to protect Emperor Hirohito from prosecution and to place the 
blame purely on the shoulders of his military and political subordinates.49  
We shall return to the corollary effects of this decision later. 
The Tokyo Trial opened on May 3, 1946, with Sir William 
Webb’s much quoted statement that “there has been no more important 
criminal trial in all history.”50  The case for the prosecution lasted until 
January 24, 1947.51  The prosecution charged that: 
 
[T]he accused participated in the formulation or execution 
of a common plan or conspiracy to wage declared or 
undeclared war or wars of aggression and war or wars in 
violation of international law, treaties, agreements and 
assurances against any country which might oppose 
them . . . with the object of securing military, naval, 
political and economic domination of East Asia and of the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans, and all countries bordering 
thereon and islands therein and ultimately the domination 
of the world.52 
 
The prosecution also raised concerns about war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, and included a section developed against individual 
defendants.53 
Along a parallel track to the Nuremberg Trial, during the 
presentation of the prosecution’s case, the defense team was allowed to 
raise a motion to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tokyo IMT.  Briefly 
summarized, the defense characterized the tribunal as constituting ex post 
facto legislation (i.e., as defining and punishing crimes ex post facto), 
because the Potsdam Declaration referred specifically to war crimes, and 
                                                 
48 TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 12–13. 
49 Id. at 13. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Joseph Keenan, Prosecution Opening Statement (June 4, 1946) in 1 THE TOKYO WAR 
CRIMES TRIAL:  THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST IN TWENTY-TWO VOLUMES 435, (R.J. Pritchard & 
S.M. Zaide eds., 1981) [hereinafter THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL]. 
53 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53. 
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did not mention crimes against peace or crimes against humanity.54  
Additionally, the defense team argued that because the Potsdam 
Declaration limited the jurisdiction of the tribunal to the Pacific War, any 
charges unassociated with the war, or that had already been  settled, were 
beyond the Tokyo IMT’s jurisdiction. 55   Finally, the defense raised 
additional claims:  that a tribunal composed of representatives of victors 
over Japan in WWII 
can be neither fair, legal nor impartial; [that] war is not a 
crime; 56  [that] individuals may not be charged with 
                                                 
54 Id.  The ex post facto defense was presented both at Nuremberg and Tokyo and failed in 
both trials for similar reasons:  (i) that murder, assault and torture were illegal at 
international law, (ii) terms such as “crimes of humanity” or “genocide” were novel, but 
only because society had not previously conceived of such systematic killing, and (iii) 
international law needed to evolve, and be able to go within the borders of sovereign states 
to protect their people from government abuse.  This last point suggested that individuals 
rather than states could be the proper targets of international legal prosecution.  See Otto 
Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterwards, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 339–342 
(1965); Bernard D. Meltzer, Robert H. Jackson:  Nuremberg’s Architect and Advocate, 68 
ALBANY L. REV. 55, 59–60 (2004).  Finally, Henry Stimson gives a passionate defense 
against the charge of ex post facto law; and appeals for the general fairness of the trials and 
the punishments. For Stimson, the charge of ex post facto law assumes “that if the 
defendant had known the proposed act was criminal he would have refrained from 
committing it.  [But] [n]othing in the attitude of the Nazi leaders corresponds to this 
assumption; their minds were wholly untroubled by the question of their guilt or 
innocence . . . .”  Henry L. Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial:  Landmark in Law, 25 FOREIGN 
AFF. 179, 183 (1947).  Furthermore, Stimson argues that international law, like common 
law, must not be viewed as static but as evolving, and thus, Nuremberg was “a new judicial 
process . . . not ex post facto law . . . [but rather] the enforcement of a [universal] moral 
judgment [on the part of human society] which date[d] back a generation” to the Kellogg 
Pact.  Id. at 184–85. 
55 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53. 
56 This was also a problem at Nuremberg because the trials were consciously staged in 
Germany as “historical” trials—meaning trials with a clear “political aspect.”  See 
Kranzbuhler, supra note 54, at 334–35.  Similarly, Kranzbuhler also mounts another 
devastating critique regarding the violation of the principle of separating executive from 
judicial powers at Nuremberg:  “two of the legislators of the London Charter . . . the 
American, Jackson, and a Britisher, Sir David Maxwell Fyffe, acted as chief prosecutors, 
thus part of the executive power, while two other legislators of the London Charter, a 
Frenchman, Falco, and a Russian, Nikichenkow, reappeared at Nuremberg in the capacity 
of judges.  By this personal overlapping, the doctrine of separation of powers was grossly 
neglected and thus the authority of the administration of justice greatly impaired from the 
very outset.”  Id. at 338.  Judge Röling, like Judge Pal, was also critical of the idea that 
crimes against peace existed prior to and during World War II because he did not see the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact as a criminal statute; nor did he see its provisions as sufficiently 
determinate to determine what was “aggressive” versus “self-defensive.”  Nevertheless, 
rather than side with Judge Pal, he concurred with the majority regarding the legality of the 
charges but established a different legal basis for it: 
 
There is no doubt that powers victorious in a ‘bellum justum’ and as 
such responsible for peace and order thereafter, have, according to 
international law, the right to counteract elements constituting a threat 
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responsibility for wars; [that] killing in war is not murder 
follows from the fact that war is legal; and [that] 
violations of the laws and customs of war are punishable 
by a trial by a military commission but not by an 
international military tribunal . . . .57 
 
The prosecution responded by pointing out the significance of 
international law that was already in place, and the unconditional nature of 
Japan’s surrender.58  At this stage, the President of the Tribunal dismissed 
the defense motions “for reasons to be given later.”59 
The case for the defense arguments followed and lasted until 
January 12, 1947.60  The defense’s presentation consisted of five parts, 
covering “general problems, relations with Manchuria and Manchukuo, 
with China, with the Soviet Union and the Pacific War.”61  The defense 
had two aims:  first, principally, to claim that “all of the acts committed by 
the defendants and the government of Japan were acts of self-defense 
against provocative acts of other nations threatening and interfering with 
Japan’s recognized and legitimate rights in Asia and her right of national 
existence,” and second, to deny “the existence of the conspiracy and joint 
action by the defendants in committing crimes against peace.” 62  
Individual defenses followed (ending on January 12, 1948),63 which in 
turn were followed by “rebuttal, surrebuttal, prosecution summation, 
defense summation and prosecution reply”64 (ending in April, 1948).65  
The Tokyo Trial is noteworthy for its length and complexity, doubling the 
number of witnesses, sessions, and duration of the proceedings of the 
Nuremberg Trial:  419 witnesses testified; there were 4,336 documents 
accepted as evidentiary exhibits; the transcript was 48,412 pages long.66 In 
contrast, the Nuremberg Trial ended in less than one year.67 
                                                                                                               
to that newly established order, and are entitled, as a means of 
preventing the recurrence of gravely offensive conduct to seek and 
retain the custody of the pertinent persons[.] 
 
Robert Cryer, Röling in Tokyo:  A Dignified Dissenter, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1109, 1115–
16 (2010). 
57 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 53–54. 
58 Id. at 54. 
59 1 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 52, at 319. 
60 TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 13. 
61 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 54. 
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To illustrate the tortuousness of the proceedings, at the Tokyo 
IMT, the eleven judges took seven months to write the judgment, and it 
took eight days to read out, starting on November 4, 1948.68  During the 
trial, two of the defendants died of natural causes; one underwent a mental 
breakdown and was found incompetent to stand trial.69  But the remaining 
twenty five were found guilty by the majority; judges from the Philippines, 
France, the Netherlands and India, as well as the president of the tribunal, 
Judge Webb, submitted separate dissenting opinions.70  Although nine of 
the eleven judges signed the majority decision, five judges wrote separate 
opinions, which included dissents by the French judge, Henri Bernard, and 
the Indian judge, Radhabinod Pal.71  Judge Pal’s 1,235 page dissent was 
strikingly different:  he argued against the majority opinion, stating that 
the Tokyo Trial was ex post facto legislation; that there was no evidence 
of a conspiracy in Japanese foreign policy during the 1930s and 1940s; 
that Japan had simply fought a defensive war; and that therefore all 
defendants should have been acquitted.72   However, probably in the 
interest of expediency given the length of the trial, none of the dissenting 
opinions were read from the bench.73 
Seven out of the twenty five defendants found guilty, including 
General Tōjō, were sentenced to death by hanging; 74  sixteen were 
sentenced to life imprisonment, one to twenty years’ imprisonment, and 
one to seven years’ imprisonment.75  It was at this point that the Tribunal 
responded to the defense’s motions, rejecting the defense challenges that:  
aggressive war was not a crime; there was no individual accountability for 
war; and the Tokyo Charter constituted illegitimate ex post facto 
legislation. 76   The Tokyo Tribunal grounded its reasoning on the 
Nuremberg IMT’s judgment of October 1946, echoing the former’s 
statements that “[t]he Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the 
part of the victorious nations but is the expression of international law 
existing at the time of its creation.” 77   The Tokyo IMT, like the 
Nuremberg IMT, also rejected the “victor’s justice” argument—that a 
                                                 
68 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 54. 
69 TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 14. 
70 Id. at 14. 
71 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 54–55. 
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74 TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 14. 
75 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 54. 
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77 20 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 52, at 48, 437 (quoting the Nuremberg 
IMT). 
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judicial body composed of representatives from the victorious nations was 
incapable of impartiality and fairness.78 
Some scholars have argued that the Tokyo Trial, in comparison to 
the Nuremberg Trial, was a grandly staged “third-string road company of 
the Nuremberg show.”79 Numerous reasons abound to explain why the 
Tokyo Trial is remembered in a less flattering light than the Nuremberg 
Trial.80  Boister and Cryer decry the Tokyo IMT’s “at times cavalier 
approach to individual liability”81 in its reliance on a conspiracy-led 
narrative that resulted in what David Cohen describes as the Tokyo IMT’s 
“drift from the individual to the collective.”82  The result, according to 
                                                 
78 See BOISTER & CRYER, supra note 40, at 32–37 (providing a detailed analysis of the 
various jurisdictional and procedural challenges to the Tokyo IMT’s authority, including 
the “victor’s justice challenge”). 
79 MINEAR, supra note 5, at 3. 
80 For example, Minear points out that perhaps due to the destruction of all wartime 
records by Japanese soldiers, as well as the distance from the sites of the crimes as well 
as the dearth of witnesses, the Tokyo IMT had less stringent criteria for admitting 
materials into evidence.  Thus, Article 13 of the Tokyo Charter (which was virtually 
identical to the Nuremberg Charter in text, but not in implementation) stated:  ‘The 
tribunal shall not be bound by the technical rules of evidence.  It shall adopt and apply to 
the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit 
any evidence which it deems to have probative value.’  In part, this approach responded 
to the difficulty, if not sheer impossibility—across the vast expanses of space and 
time—to secure incriminating evidence, much of which had been purposefully 
destroyed, or to locate witnesses.  Minear details some of the more problematic 
evidentiary instances that resulted:  “There were press releases offered by the 
prosecution, although the tribunal rejected press releases offered by defense.  There was 
a conversation with a person since deceased.  There were letters from private Japanese 
citizens to the War Ministry; these the defense denounced as ‘crank letters.’”  Id. at 120.  
Yet even more damning was the Tokyo IMT’s uncertainty regarding what the rules were, 
and thus, its high reliance on the “large and somewhat unpredictable discretion” of the 
eleven politically-chosen judges.  See Robert H. Jackson, Report of Robert H. Jackson, 
United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials (1945), 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack_preface.asp.  But see Kevin R. Chaney, 
Pitfall and Imperatives:  Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War 
Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 57, 76 (1995) (stating that the defendants at 
Nuremberg also faced evidentiary hurdles because evidence that implicated the Allied 
powers was inadmissible). 
81 BOISTER & CRYER, supra note 40, at 245.  See also Kirsten Sellars, Imperfect Justice at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1085, 1094 n.40. 
82 David Cohen, Beyond Nuremberg:  Individual Responsibility for War Crimes in Human 
Rights in POLITICAL TRANSITIONS 60–61 (C. Hesse & R. Post eds., 1999); see also Sellars, 
supra note 81, at 1094 n.38.  Additionally, Neil Boister sees the legacy of the Tokyo IMT 
as “a tale of how, using the doctrines of inchoate conspiracy (approved by the Majority 
judgment), joint criminal enterprise (approved by the Majority judgment) and unjustified 
homicide (neither accepted nor rejected by the Majority) these two concepts—collective 
responsibility and comprehensive responsibility—can be run together to ‘resolve’ the 
problem of dealing efficiently with an extremely complex situation.”  Neil Boister, The 
Application of Collective and Comprehensive Criminal Responsibility for Aggression at 
the Tokyo International Military Tribunal:  The Measure of the Crime of Aggression?, 8 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 425, 446 (2010). 
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Boister, was the infinite expansion of responsibility for crimes of 
aggression at the Tokyo IMT, and thus, their “over-criminalization.”83  
The “ironic” or “paradoxical” result of this strategy of turning an entire 
class of leaders into scapegoats, was to absolve a still larger class, that of 
the polity at large, from responsibility for the war or from the crimes 
committed in connection with it.  Thus, many Japanese, unlike most 
Germans, ended up feeling no guilt or responsibility for the crimes 
committed by their country and by their countrymen during the Second 
World War.84 
Yet, as Kirsten Sellars argues in Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo, the Tokyo IMT must also be viewed within the context of the 
backlash against the Nuremberg IMT’s Charter and Indictment, and 
especially the most critically-reviewed category of charges, that of 
“crimes against peace.”85  In her review of Boister and Cryer’s work, 
Sellars notes that Tokyo became a “catalyst for debate about the future of 
international law.” 86   In reviewing the dissent of Judge Pal, who 
“famously absolved the Japanese defendants of all guilt,” and the broader 
background of dissent and criticism which had marked the reception of the 
Nuremberg Trial by contemporary jurists, Sellars contends that “[t]he 
prosecuting powers were well aware” that the “crimes against peace” 
charge had been found wanting on legal grounds, and “hoped that the 
Tokyo Judgment would confirm Nuremberg’s determinations on 
aggressive war, thereby settling the debate.”87  The inadvertent result of 
this effort to shore up Nuremberg was that the crimes that had formed the 
moral core of the Nuremberg IMT’s Indictment, “crimes against 
humanity,” and their accompanying evidence in the form of riveting 
footage of Holocaust camps, were eclipsed.  Thus, whereas Germany’s 
crimes came to be viewed as “exceptional,” Japan’s became framed as 
“unexceptional.” 88   The popular inference drawn, and the eventual 
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  Boister believes the lesson to be learned from the Tokyo IMT’s dismal heritage is 
that “the more you hold a group of individual leaders legally responsible for war, the less 
the rest of the population feel politically responsible.”  Id. 
85 Sellars, supra note 81, at 1097 (“As a consequence, every possible measure was taken 
to ensure that Tokyo backed Nuremberg over this problematic charge, from the drafting 
of the Tokyo Indictment, which attempted to reinforce the crimes against peace charge 
with the conspiracy and murder charges, to the attempts before and during the trial to 
focus on aggression to the exclusion of other substantive charges.”)  Determined that 
Nuremberg—especially in relation to its characterization of “crimes against peace”—
should not be dismissed as “bad law,” the prosecuting powers “either privately sounded 
out the judges over schemes designed to ensure that the judgment echoed the 
Nuremberg line . . . or pressured them to abandon their disagreements with crimes 
against peace . . . .”  Id. 
86 Id. at 1094. 
87 Id. at 1095, 1097. 
88 Id. at 1093. 
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patrimony resulting, were that although Japan “had certainly presided over 
wholesale assaults and terrible atrocities . . . they had not broken the 
mould of international politics by instituting polices to systematically 
annihilate entire national, ethnic, racial or religious groups.”89  Again, this 
helps explain another basis for the Tokyo IMT’s tragic heritage of 
amnesia and denial. 
On November 24, 1948, General MacArthur, operating under the 
legitimizing aegis of the Tokyo Charter, confirmed the judgment of the 
Tokyo Tribunal.90  However, there was a temporary stay of execution 
while the defendants appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court for writs of 
habeas corpus; they appealed on November 29, 1948,91 and that appeal, as 
discussed supra, was dismissed on December 20, 1948.92  The executions 
were carried out inside Sugamo Prison on December 23, 1948. 93  
Ultimately, the Japanese government accepted the Tokyo Tribunal’s 
decision in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 1951, which in 
1952 ended the American occupation of Japan.94 
C. The Purposes of the Tokyo Trial 
The Tokyo IMT styled itself after the Nuremberg IMT, adopting 
the same heavily didactic tone, and attempting to justify its holdings both 
as principled judgments and as historical tutelage.  For example, Robert 
M.W. Kempner, one of the junior prosecutors at Nuremberg, described the 
Nuremberg Trial as “the greatest history seminar ever held in the history 
of the world.”95  Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British chief prosecutor, 
remarked in a similar vein that the Nuremberg Trial would leave behind 
“an authoritative and impartial record to which future historians may turn 
for truth.”96  In a parallel way, Chief Prosecutor Joseph Keenan vividly 
described his vision for the purpose of the Tokyo Trial: 
 
Our purpose is one of prevention or deterrence.  It has 
nothing whatsoever to do with the small meaner purpose 
of vengeance or retaliation.  But we do hope in these 
proceedings that it is neither impossible nor improbable 
that the branding of individuals who visit these scourges 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 55. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 14. 
94 FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 55. 
95 IAN BURUMA, THE WAGES OF GUILT:  MEMORIES OF WAR IN GERMANY AND JAPAN 144–
45 (1994). 
96  3 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 – 1 OCTOBER 1946, 92 (1947). 
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upon mankind as common felons, and punishing them 
accordingly, may have a deterring effect upon aggressive 
warlike activities of their prototypes of the future, should 
they arise.97 
 
Thus, the Tokyo prosecution’s language was laced with grandiose didactic 
metaphors, picturing the Tokyo IMT as the trial to “end all wars . . . [and] 
part of the determined battle of civilization to preserve the entire world 
from destruction.”98 
However, the Tokyo Trial’s strategic objectives were also 
simultaneously aligned with the United States’ forward-looking policy 
objectives regarding its occupation of Japan.  These objectives were: 
 
(a) to insure that Japan will not again become a 
menace to the United States or to the peace and security of 
the world; 
(b) to bring about the eventual establishment of a 
peaceful and responsible government which will respect 
the rights of other states and will support the objectives of 
the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations.99 
 
The overarching and implicit goal was therefore to transform Japan, 
through demilitarization and democratization, from being an enemy to an 
ally, in anticipation of what eventually came to be called the Cold War 
realignment.  The United States, growing increasingly estranged from 
China and from the U.S.S.R. for ideological reasons, foresaw that it would 
be necessary to maintain friendly relations with Japan.100  In addition, 
“after the 1949 Communist revolution in China, neither the People’s 
Republic of China nor the Republic of China demanded wartime 
reparations from Japan (as Israel had from Germany) because the two 
governments were competing for Japanese trade and political 
recognition.”101  The result, as we shall later see, has been a heritage of 
convenient collective amnesia, both by the former Allies and by Japan.  
Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the procedural devices of the 
Tokyo IMT against the backdrop of the Nuremberg IMT, in order to 
                                                 
97 1 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 52, at 387–88. 
98 Id. at 384. 
99 See FUTAMURA, supra note 17, at 56 (citing government memorandum SWNCC 150/4/A, 
of Sept. 21, 1945). 
100 CHANG, supra note 1, at 11. 
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assess how the Tokyo IMT achieved its objective of converting Japan 
from a military enemy to a political and economic ally.102 
D. Legal and Extra-Legal Devices of the Tokyo IMT 
Similar to the Nuremberg IMT, the Tokyo IMT endorsed demilitarization 
and democratization.  And just as with Nuremberg, it was not enough 
merely to punish the war criminals being tried.  It was necessary to 
convince the Japanese people that these war criminals deserved their 
punishment.  To accomplish this end, the Allies pursued two strategies:  
first, pursuing the individual responsibilities of war criminals (as opposed 
to arguing for a blanket indictment of Japan), and second, creating a 
didactic historical record of the war and its associated war crimes. 
1.  Pursuing Individual Responsibility 
Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration clearly described the Allied 
goal of differentiating between the individual war criminals and the main 
of the Japanese nation:  “We do not intend that the Japanese shall be 
enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted 
out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon 
our prisoners.”103  In addition, Article 10 also provided the blueprint for 
the demilitarization and democratization of Japan, which was closely tied 
up with the strategy of individualizing (and thus de-collectivizing) 
responsibility for Japan’s WWII crimes.  “The Japanese Government shall 
remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic 
tendencies among the Japanese people.  Freedom of speech, of religion, 
and of thought, as well as respect for . . . fundamental human rights shall 
be established.”104  Yet it was Article 6 that clearly pointed a finger at 
specific individuals and specifically contributed to the physical 
demilitarization of Japan, which would later be constitutionalized, by 
excising its former military leaders, whom it implied were malicious 
deceivers and master manipulators: 
 
                                                 
102 There are two parallel observations connecting the Tokyo IMT to the Nuremberg IMT.  
First, the United States also tried to convert Germany into an ally, for similar political 
reasons.  Second, even though Nuremberg is remembered as more successful than Tokyo, 
some scholars believe that the Nuremberg Trial promoted a similar collective amnesia; 
indeed, sentences at Nuremberg became progressively lighter over the course of the 
proceedings.  See Brian F. Havel, In Search of a Theory of Public Memory:  The State, the 
Individual, and Marcel Proust, 80 IND. L.J. 605, 635 (2005) (examining efforts in Austria 
to expunge war guilt). 
103 Proclamation of Terms for Japanese Surrender (Potsdam Declaration), ¶ 10, July 26, 
1945, 3 Bevans 1204, 1205 (1968). 
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There must be eliminated for all time the authority and 
influence of those who have deceived and misled the 
people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we 
insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will 
be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from 
the world.105 
 
But physical demilitarization was just the first step; the next was 
the psychological demilitarization of Japan, by rhetorically strengthening 
a narrative of these insidious war criminals victimizing the hapless and 
oblivious Japanese nation, and by emphasizing the legitimacy and fairness 
of the Tokyo Trial.  Keenan’s opening statement drove that point home: 
 
We must reach the conclusion that the Japanese people 
themselves were utterly within the power and forces of 
these accused, and to such extent were its victims . . . .  
[W]e would point out that the forces of occupation, who 
have the full power under the terms of surrender to 
implement its terms in such manner as they should see fit, 
have given full opportunity to the Japanese people and to 
the world to observe the fair manner in which the [trial] is 
being conducted.106 
 
Keenan’s rhetoric simultaneously poised him as the speaker both 
for Japan’s external victims (in particular, China) and for those Japanese 
who also suffered under its repressive regime.  Keenan thus contrasted the 
“[s]tern punishment imposed by orderly international tribunals”107 with 
the probable “bloody purges”108 and “judicial lynchings”109 that outraged 
non-Japanese and Japanese victims would enact, if justice were not meted 
out to these war criminals.  In taking this position, Keenan allegedly spoke 
for the victims of the Japanese army during WWII.  Yet what ultimately 
emerged from the trial was the protection of U.S. interests in avenging the 
attack on Pearl Harbor (as an initial step to rehabilitating its former 
enemy), not the protection of the rights of civilians of other Asian nations 
ravaged by Japan during WWII.110 
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108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 See id. (citing MacArthur and others). 
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2.  Creating a Historical Record 
Clearly, the purpose of the Tokyo Trial was more than simply 
punishment.  The Tribunal focused on leaving behind a didactic legacy 
and a specific historical narrative—one that was meant for future 
generations, especially the Japanese.  As the defense stated: “[t]he purpose 
of the trial was to convince the Japanese people that their leaders misled 
them into war.”111  Similarly, the Allied-controlled Japanese media in its 
major newspapers “serialize[d] the history of the Pacific War, based on 
the sources offered by General Headquarters, SCAP, the so-called GHQ” 
headed by General MacArthur.112  The Japanese media’s story mimed the 
narrative of the Tokyo Trial:  that conniving militarists in the Japanese 
government kept the truth from the Japanese nation, and had brutally 
committed atrocities in China and the Philippines, particularly victimizing 
Allied soldiers and locals.113   
However, the trial was not meant only for the Japanese, but also 
intended to appease the American public regarding the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, and to justify why it had been necessary to drop two Atomic 
bombs on Japan.114  As the Dutch judge, Bernard Victor Aloysius Röling, 
said, “a trial was . . . desired to show the American people and the whole 
world the criminal treachery of the attack on Hawaii.”115  Even more 
importantly, for posterity’s sake, staging a trial, rather than a summary 
execution, was important as an “ethical example of democracy, showing 
that law and justice can be applied even to enemies through a fair trial.”116 
III. DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN THE NUREMBERG AND TOKYO 
TRIALS 
Although there are many similarities between the Nuremberg IMT 
and the Tokyo IMT (especially given that the Tokyo Charter was based on 
the Nuremberg Charter), there are also striking differences between them, 
which help explain why there is a general silence regarding the gains of 
the Tokyo IMT.  These differences can be roughly grouped into three 
subtopics:  (i) issues of fairness and politics, (ii) the degree of involvement 
of the United States in the Tokyo trial, and (iii) the prosecutorial strategy 
of pursuing crimes against peace rather than crimes against humanity. 
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A. Issues of Fairness and Politics 
If the Nuremberg Trial has suffered from the reputation of being an 
example of “victor’s justice,” the Tokyo Trial is  viewed even more 
ambivalently, as evidenced in the judges’ varying opinions at its 
conclusion.  For one thing, there was much negative feedback regarding 
the trial’s lack of procedural fairness.  For example, in terms of access to 
lawyers familiar with the Anglo-American law of the Tribunal, the 
prosecution was clearly privileged.  The Japanese government requested 
that General MacArthur provide British and American lawyers for the 
defense.117  However, because British lawyers were prohibited by British 
law from practicing in foreign jurisdictions, all fifteen attorneys eventually 
allocated were provided solely by the United States, and in spite of urgent 
requests, arrived two weeks after the beginning of the trial.118 
 In addition, out of 230 translators, 175 worked with the 
prosecution and only 55 with the defense.  The scope of their work 
included “approximately 30,000 pages of exhibits” and “3,195 documents, 
plus countless other statements . . . in English, Japanese, Chinese, 
Annamese [that is, Vietnamese], Dutch, French, German, Italian, Malayan, 
Russian, Spanish, Swedish, Burmese, Marshallese, Mongolian, Solomon 
Island dialects, and Tho, a language used in northern French 
Indochina.”119  The defense’s concern over the lack of translators is 
revealed in a letter, dated November 25, 1946, from the defense to a court 
administrative officer:  “[I]t would be a tremendous embarrassment to the 
Supreme Commander [MacArthur], the Tribunal and the Defense 
should . . . the Defense break down because of [an] inability to process 
and clear those documents without undue delay.”120  Furthermore, initially, 
the defense had only three translators to assist them, while the prosecution 
had 102.121  Nevertheless, the prosecution’s mammoth translation team 
also worked against it, contributing to, as Meirion and Susie Harries 
hypothesize, “constant breaches of security,” that is to say, press leaks.122 
                                                 
117 TAKEDA, supra note 12, at 12. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 42 (quoting 200 Language Experts Complete Huge Task, NIPPON TIMES, Nov. 14, 
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 On the broader issue of the trial’s fairness, the question of whether 
it or Nuremberg produced the harsher (arguably unduly harsh) sentences is 
debatable, but there are good arguments in support of Tokyo.123  For 
example, the Nuremberg Tribunal acquitted three, but the Tokyo Tribunal 
acquitted no one.124  On the other hand, the Tokyo IMT sentenced only 
seven out of twenty-five defendants to death, while the Nuremberg IMT 
meted out the death sentence to twelve out of twenty defendants.125  But as 
Richard Minear points out, when death and life-imprisonment sentences 
are combined, the Tokyo trial seems more punitive; it so sentenced 
twenty-three out of twenty-five accused individuals, while the Nuremberg 
trial sentenced fifteen out of twenty-two.126  Ultimately, the legitimacy of 
the Tokyo IMT was clouded by statements from some of its judges 
concerning the unnecessary harshness of some of its sentences.127  In some 
ways, more memorable than the majority opinion was the 1,235-page 
dissent of the Indian Judge Radhabinod Pal.128  Judge Pal argued that 
every defendant ought to be acquitted, (i) because the Tokyo Trial was “ex 
post facto legislation,” (ii) because “there was no evidence . . . of a 
conspiracy in Japanese foreign policy during [the] 1930s and 1940s,” and 
(iii) because Japan’s wars had simply been in “self-defense” rather than 
motivated by aggression.129  These arguments were later marshaled in 
support of the claim that Japan’s war crimes had never happened, and that 
the Tokyo IMT had been simply an unabashed instance of “victor’s 
justice.” 
 Finally, in terms of politics, the Tokyo IMT bears a clearer 
imprint of the shift in relations between the United States and the Soviet 
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Union.  The Nuremberg trial closed in October 1946,130 and by 1948 it 
was clear that both the United States and Great Britain had lost enthusiasm 
for any further prosecutions of Japanese Class A war criminals, given the 
length of the Tokyo Trial. 131   Since by 1947 the objectives of 
demilitarization and democratization seemed to have been sufficiently 
achieved, the United States pivoted and sought to transform Japan into an 
ally in the fight against communism in Asia.132  Thus, after General Tōjō 
and others were executed on December 1948, nineteen Class A war crimes 
suspects, initially held in custody in anticipation of a second round of 
trials, were released.133  Shortly thereafter, in February 1949, General 
MacArthur announced the official policy regarding ceasing prosecutions 
against major war criminals in Japan.134  Emboldened by the shifting 
political climate, in 1952, Japan requested several states to release their 
war criminals, based on the premise that the formalization of peace could 
give the issue of Japanese war crimes a political solution.135  Finally, by 
the end of 1958, all former Allies, with the Communist exceptions of the 
Soviet Union and China, had released their remaining Japanese prisoners, 
including Class B and C war criminals.136  That political solution helped to 
cement the Tokyo IMT’s heritage of collective amnesia. 
B. The Degree of Involvement of the United States in the 
Tokyo Trial 
The United States, particularly in the form of General MacArthur, 
clearly had a dominant hand in shaping the events surrounding the Tokyo 
IMT, unlike the Nuremberg IMT.  The Nuremberg Charter issued from 
the London Agreement, which was a joint declaration by the United States, 
France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, and eventually ratified 
by nineteen other countries.137  In contrast, General MacArthur, through 
an executive decree, issued the Tokyo Charter.138  Furthermore, the Tokyo 
Charter (though based on the Nuremberg Charter) was drafted by the 
prosecution, which was staffed purely by American lawyers.139  As if that 
were not egregious enough, the Tokyo Charter granted MacArthur the 
authority to appoint the judges and the president of the tribunal, and to 
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review their judgments.140  This is in sharp contrast to Nuremberg, where 
the four Allied powers who had signed the London Agreement each 
appointed their own judges, who in turn chose the president of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal.141  Finally, unlike Nuremberg, where each of the 
four signatories had their own chief prosecutors,142 at Tokyo, because the 
United States had played a dominant role in the military defeat of Japan, 
there was simply one chief prosecutor from the United States and ten 
associate prosecutors from the other countries.143 
 Precisely because U.S. political interests shaped the unfolding of 
the Tokyo Trial, there were several significant issues that were not 
addressed.  For example, the human experiments and biological warfare 
research conducted by Unit 731 in Manchuria under Lieutenant General 
Ishii Shiro, along with Japan’s alleged use of biological weapons in the 
Chinese theater, were granted immunity in exchange for information.144  It 
appears the United States wanted to monopolize the information on 
biological warfare, and concealed it from the Soviet Union;145 as Judge 
Röling points out with the benefit of hindsight, one defendant who 
established a biological laboratory escaped a death sentence simply 
because the Court was not informed of the relevant facts.146 
 Furthermore, principally because MacArthur strongly opposed the 
indictment of the Japanese Emperor (even if the Japanese military had 
waged war in his name), the Emperor was similarly granted immunity.147  
As part of the U.S. strategy to rehabilitate and convert Japan into an ally, 
the Japanese Emperor was shielded from prosecution in the hope of 
preserving social order.  In keeping with their own political interests, both 
China and the Soviet Union agreed to go along in granting imperial 
immunity; only Australia objected.148 
 Finally, ironically, many crimes committed in Asia were deemed 
beyond the purview of the Tokyo IMT.  Out of the eleven judges, only 
three came from Asia:  China, India and the Philippines, although it was 
the Asian countries that had been ravaged by the Japanese army.149  
Although the Nanking Massacre was addressed to some extent,150 Japan’s 
actions in Taiwan and Korea, areas which were under colonial rule, did 
not come under scrutiny, leading to the question of why the Nazi atrocities 
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against German Jews differed from these acts as crimes against 
humanity.151  In sum, American and other Allied interests in securing the 
post-war Pacific arena helped cement the Tokyo IMT’s legacy of 
effacement and forgetfulness. 
C. The Strategy of Pursuing Crimes Against Peace 
Unlike the Nuremberg IMT, which had four counts for indictment 
(conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity), the Tokyo IMT had a complicated 55 counts, which were 
grouped into headings:  “Crimes against peace (Group I:  counts 1 to 36); 
murder (Group II:  counts 37 to 52); and conventional war crimes and 
crimes against humanity (Group III:  counts 53 to 55).”152  The procedure 
of lumping together conventional war crimes with crimes against 
humanity, de facto, caused crimes against humanity to disappear into war 
crimes, giving the impression that the Japanese crimes were somehow not 
as heinous as the Nazi atrocities—a position that is problematic, as we 
have seen earlier.153 
 The Tokyo Trial appeared to focus more on crimes against peace 
than on crimes against humanity, for “no defendant was prosecuted 
without a charge of committing crimes against peace.”154  Although no 
one was given a death sentence for conspiracy and crimes against peace 
alone, at Tokyo, “22 defendants out of 25 were found guilty of at least one 
count in the category of crimes against peace, while in Nuremberg, 16 out 
of 22 defendants were charged for crimes against peace and 12 were found 
guilty.”155 
However, the more important aftermath of choosing to pursue 
crimes against peace, as opposed to crimes against humanity, was that it 
led to controversy and confusion.  Crimes against peace, which hinged on 
whether the war had been “aggressive” or simply “defensive,” constituted 
a more contested legal category than conventional war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.156  While the war in Europe clearly started with Nazi 
aggression, there were conflicting narratives regarding whether Japan’s 
war in the Pacific was purely aggressive or had an element of self-
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defense.157  Nevertheless, the net effect of focusing on crimes against 
peace, as opposed to crimes against humanity, was to obscure the extent of 
the Japanese atrocities during World War II.  Unlike Nazi brutality, which 
became the iconic image of inhumanity, Japanese crimes, especially 
dealing with gender violence, were covered over, as part of the price of 
converting Japan from enemy into ally, with the emerging Cold War 
realignment of alliances.  As Iris Chang points out: 
 
After the 1949 Communist revolt in China, neither the 
People’s Republic of China nor the Republic of China 
demanded wartime reparations from Japan (as Israel had 
from Germany) because the two governments were 
competing for Japanese trade and political recognition.  
And even the United States, faced with the threat of 
communism in the Soviet Union and mainland China, 
sought to ensure the friendship and loyalty of its former 
enemy, Japan.  In this manner, cold war tensions 
permitted Japan to escape much of the intense critical 
examination that its wartime ally [Germany] was forced to 
undergo.158 
 
Ironically, the U.S. strategy at the Tokyo IMT backfired:  not only 
has the trial become largely forgotten or remembered with shame, but it 
has also been decried as a notoriously political “show trial” by the 
majority of the Japanese, who felt collectively persecuted. 159 The result 
was a psychologically complex reaction, which succeeding generations 
imbibed:  “While the Japanese . . . because of passive acceptance and 
cynicism, remained as bystanders at the Tokyo Trial and did not take its 
significance actively and personally . . . they, nonetheless, felt frustrated 
that the trial blamed them collectively as a nation.”160  This complicated 
mix of collective guilt and denial persists even today, and ironically, one 
of the guiding principles behind the Tokyo IMT, designed to shield the 
Japanese from collective responsibility, has been blamed for helping 
generate a sense of “responsibility over past war crimes [that have] . . . 
stretched out vertically and horizontally, growing into a timeless collective 
responsibility.”161 
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IV. THE TOKYO IMT’S LEGACY OF FORGETTING CRIMES OF 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
A. Visualizing and Obliterating the Rape of Nanking 
At the Tokyo Trial, atrocities committed by the Japanese were 
revealed through a variety of sources:  news reports, surveys, statistics, 
and witness testimony.162  The Tokyo IMT unearthed a pantheon of 
horrible new ways of torturing human beings: 
 
[O]f marches (such as the infamous Bataan Death March) 
in which gravely ill and starved prisoners dropped dead 
from exhaustion, of the savage conditions behind the 
construction of the Siam-Burma Death Railway, of the 
Japanese “water treatment” that pumped water or 
kerosene into the noses and mouths of victims until their 
bowels ruptured, of suspension of POWs by wrists, arms 
or legs until their joints were literally ripped from their 
sockets, of victims being forced to kneel on sharp 
instruments, of excruciating extractions of nails from 
fingers, of electric shock torture, of naked women forced 
to sit on charcoal stoves, of every imaginable form of 
beating and flogging . . . even of vivisection and 
cannibalism.163 
 
Chang claims that empirical studies show that the Japanese surpassed the 
Nazis in their cruelty towards captives:  “only one in twenty-five 
American POWs died under Nazi captivity, in contrast to one in three 
under the Japanese.”164 
 Yet the chief metaphor for Japanese atrocities, at the Tokyo IMT, 
was the Rape of Nanking.  Chang passionately argues for the uniqueness 
of the brutality of Rape of Nanking, not only for the sheer number of 
deaths, but also for the cruelty with which the deaths were executed. 
 
[W]hether we use the most conservative number—
260,000—or the highest—350,000—it is shocking to 
contemplate that the deaths at Nanking far exceeded the 
deaths from the American raids on Tokyo (an estimated 
80,000-120,000 deaths) and even the combined death toll 
of the two atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the 
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end of 1945 (estimated at 140,000 and 70,000 
respectively). 
. . . 
Chinese men were used for bayonet practice and in 
decapitation contests.  An estimated 20,000-80,000 
Chinese women were raped.  Many soldiers went beyond 
rape to disembowel women, slice off their breasts, nail 
them alive to walls.  Fathers were forced to rape their 
daughters, and sons their mothers, as other family 
members watched.  Not only did live burials, castration, 
the carving of organs and the roasting of people become 
routine, but more diabolical tortures were practiced, such 
as hanging people by their tongues on iron hooks or 
burying people to their waists and watching them get torn 
apart by German shepherds.  So sickening was the 
spectacle that even the Nazis in the city were horrified, 
one proclaiming the massacre to be the work of “bestial 
machinery.”165 
 
 The Tokyo IMT unequivocally denounced the Rape of Nanking, 
citing it as an instance of clear government policy, sanctioned by the 
highest levels of government (except for the Emperor), which were 
informed of the developments, and even celebrated the atrocities in Japan, 
before international condemnation set in.  Chang claims in 
commemoration of the victory over Nanking, special Nanking noodles 
were prepared in Tokyo;166  Japanese children proudly carried globe-
shaped, candle-lit paper lanterns in evening parades to symbolize Japanese 
ascendancy; 167  photos of the atrocities committed were proudly 
heralded.168  It was only after news of international outrage (interestingly, 
more about the bombing and sinking of the U.S.S. Panay, an American 
gunship, than all the slaughter, rape, and torture)169 broke out that the 
Japanese government sought to exert damage control by concealing the 
extent and nature of the atrocities committed, and to replace the shocking 
news with propaganda.170 
 The Rape of Nanking unfolded in the international spotlight.  
Months before, and during the actual siege, media correspondents 
provided vivid, up-to-date coverage of the events.171  The three American 
journalists most influential in forming public opinion were New York 
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Times reporter, Frank Tillman Durdin; Chicago Daily News’ Archibald 
Steele; and the Associated Press’ C. Yates McDaniel.172  All three men 
were not only instrumental to writing riveting stories about the events, but 
also became actively involved in saving Chinese lives and retrieving body 
parts of relatives whom the Japanese had murdered.173   In addition, 
Universal Studios’ Norman Alley and Fox Movietone’s Eric Mayell 
happened to be on board the ill-fated U.S.S. Panay, and managed to 
squirrel away footage of the action; the film was initially buried in mud, 
and later retrieved and played in theaters across the United States.174  
Furthermore, not only had the events occurred in full view of the Japanese 
Embassy in Nanking, but also, the International Committee had visited the 
Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese Embassy, to file reports, and 
even purportedly filing two protests a day for the first six weeks of the 
Nanking Occupation.175 
 Given the extent of the coverage, it is difficult to believe that the 
Japanese Emperor and the royal family were completely unaware of the 
extent and brutal nature of the slaughter.  Nevertheless, Matsui Iwane, the 
commander of Japan’s Central China Expeditionary Force, assumed 
complete responsibility for the Nanking atrocities.176  Chang conjectures 
that the “tubercular,” “sickly” and “frail” Matsui had simply been a 
(willing) scapegoat as he was not even in Nanking when the city fell into 
Japanese hands.177  Furthermore, Matsui’s testimony, at the Tokyo IMT 
had significant gaps, and was contradictory.  “[H]e waffled between lies 
and occasional self-denunciation.  He tried to make excuses . . . sometimes 
denied [the atrocities] completely . . . and [engaged in] . . . circuitous, 
vaguely mystical discussions about Buddhism and the nature of Sino-
Japanese friendship.”178  In addition, the self-flagellating Matsui erected, 
in his hometown of Atami, close to Tokyo, a shrine of remorse—a statue 
of Kannon, Buddhist Goddess of Mercy, sculpted from clay imported 
from the Yangtze River mingled with Japanese soil.179  To atone further, 
the Matsui family hired a priestess to chant prayers and weep for the dead 
Chinese.180  Nevertheless, Matsui never pointed a finger at the royal 
family, saying only that the tragedy occurred because of his failure to 
guide Prince Asaka and the Emperor, and that it was his duty to die for 
them.181    
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 Despite the strong indirect proof that the royal family most likely 
was aware of, and sanctioned, the brutalities committed by the Japanese 
military in Nanking,182 both Prince Asaka and Emperor Hirohito never 
spent a day in jail, and lived on to “enjoy lives of leisure and national 
adoration.”183  Another shameful legacy of the Tokyo IMT is that whereas 
many of the Japanese torturers were awarded full military pensions and 
benefits from the Japanese government, “thousands of their victims 
suffered (and continue to suffer) lives of silent poverty, shame, or chronic 
physical and mental pain.” 184   That relegation to silence has been 
described as a “second rape,” not by Japan, but by the colluding Allied 
powers.185 
B. Attempting to Obliterate Traces of Comfort Stations and 
Comfort Women 
If the Nazis systematized the extermination of Jews through gas 
chambers, the Japanese systematized the rape and sexual slavery of 
women in territories occupied by the Japanese between 1930-1945 
through “comfort stations.”186  These women were sometimes listed as 
“war supplies;”187 in other accounts, they were referred to as “girl armies,” 
which is appropriate, as 80% of the reported Korean comfort women were 
between fourteen to eighteen years old.188  The statistical data, gathered 
through hotlines set up in 1992 to gather data on these military barracks of 
sexual slavery, conjures up an efficient and vast machinery for shipping 
women, under the jurisdiction and supervision of Japan’s Ministry of 
War,189 comparable to the Nazi bureaucracy of sending Jews to death 
camps: 
 
Among the Tokyo callers, who were the most numerous, 
79 referred to comfort stations in China, 56 to Manchuria, 
36 to Southeast Asia, 22 to the Western Pacific, 23 to 
Japan and 6 to Korea.  In Kyoto, 65 callers referred to 
China, . . . 4 to Korea, 2 to New Guinea, . . . 4 to . . . 
[Indonesia], 8 to the Philippines, 3 to Burma and 2 each to 
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Malaya, Thailand, French Indochina, Japan and 
Taiwan . . . .190 
 
 The wide range of nationalities represented in the “girl army” 
showed how ruthlessly and systematically women of all nationalities who 
came under Japanese control were duped, abducted or violently forced to 
become sex slaves:191  Korean, Taiwanese, “Manchus” (meaning non-
Chinese ethnic groups), mainland Chinese, Indonesians, Vietnamese, 
Filipinas, Dutch, Burmese, Malays, White Russians (in Manchuria), Thai, 
and also, interestingly, Japanese.192  In addition, the ratio of troops to 
comfort women is staggering, and reveals an estimate of the total enslaved 
population.  The “ideal” ratio (of troops to comfort women) would have 
been 29:1 (meaning each soldier would have access to sex every day),193 
but the actual ratio, based on studies, is closer to 50:1,194 leading to the 
following calculation:  “If we assume a ratio of 50:1, then the total of 
some 7 million troops from all theatres of war indicates that there would 
have been about 139,000 comfort women at most.”195 
 One justification for the creation of these barracks of sexual 
slavery was that it would theoretically prevent the Japanese army from 
engaging in an unmitigated spree of rapes,196 as had happened at Nanking.  
Sadly, the establishment of the comfort stations did not stop rape in any of 
the occupied territories.197  Not only did the creation of the comfort 
stations engender an officially sanctioned system of sexual violence; in 
addition, it also strengthened a culture of permissiveness, because 
punishments for rape remained lenient in the Japanese Army Penal 
Code.198  Looting, combined with rape, though, was another matter, as the 
punishment for the combined offense, according to Paragraph Two, 
Article 86 of the Army Penal Code:  “at least seven years of penal 
servitude and at most lifetime imprisonment.”199  To escape the combined 
charge, rapists simply killed their victims, and military commanders 
looked the other way, viewing rape as a means for “building troop 
morale.”200 
 The other goal, in building comfort stations, was to prevent 
Japanese soldiers from becoming infected with sexually transmitted 
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diseases, knowing that soldiers used sex as a release from the stress and 
trauma of war;201 even more importantly, if the infected soldiers returned 
home and spread the diseases in their home country, a health pandemic 
would emerge.202  As a small sample of the problem, the number of 
soldiers of the 19th and 20th Divisions of the North China Area Army, who 
had contracted sexually transmitted diseases came to 985.203  To stem the 
tide of diseases, the military banned the use of civilian prostitutes and 
gave strict and detailed instructions on the best way to avail of the comfort 
stations, including an injunction presuming that every comfort woman is a 
carrier of sexually transmitted diseases.204  Thus, elaborate instructions 
were issued, which included checking for the woman’s health papers 
(proving she had recently been inspected for sexually transmitted 
diseases); making the woman wash before sex; always using a condom 
and a disinfecting lubricant; disinfecting immediately after intercourse; 
stopping by the medical office for treatment especially with signs of early 
infection, among others.205  Given the complexity of these instructions, it 
is highly doubtful that the soldiers actually followed them, and thus, it is 
hardly surprising that instead of decreasing the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases, ironically, the comfort stations actually facilitated the 
spread of these diseases.206  
 Nevertheless, there is evidence that the Japanese government very 
deliberately designed the comfort stations to fit into loopholes in 
international law, prohibiting the trafficking in women and girls. There 
were four international treaties in force at that time:  (i) The International 
Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic (1904),207 (ii) The 
International Convention for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic 
(1910),208 (iii) The International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic 
in Women and Children (1921),209 and (iv) The International Convention 
for the Suppression of Traffic in Adult Women and Girls (1933).210  
Although Japan did not sign the 1933 treaty, by 1925 it was a signatory to 
the other three, all of which outlawed the prostitution of underage girls, 
even with their consent, and rendered criminal the use of violence, 
compulsion, or fraud in forcing a woman “of age” to become a 
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prostitute.211  However, there was a major loophole in the three treaties:  
they exempted colonies from their prohibitions.  For example, Article 11 
of the 1910 treaty presumed in the absence of a writing to the contrary that 
none of the treaty’s prohibitions applied to signatories’ colonies. 212  
Similarly, Article 14 of the 1921 treaty allowed signatories to declare their 
colonies exempt from treaty provisions.213 
 Given these loopholes, the Japanese government considered 
Korea, Taiwan, China, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Region—all 
occupied territories, and therefore colonies—as exempt from prohibitions 
against the trafficking and prostitution of girls.214  That to some extent 
explains the proliferation of comfort stations in the occupied territories, 
especially in Korea.  The Japanese tried to prevent the occupied territories 
from uniting in rebellion, and exploited regional tensions to maintain 
control.  Korea, unlike Taiwan, was historically antagonistic to China, and 
its population easier to isolate.215  As a consequence of cultural prejudices 
and Japanese exploitation of regional tensions, Korean women suffered 
more than most.  In terms of ethnic status, in the eyes of the Japanese, they 
were desirable because they ranked as most akin and were second only to 
Japanese and Okinawan women.  After them in the pecking order came 
the Chinese, and lastly Southeast Asians, who were darker-skinned and 
thus not as desirable.216  Finally, because Japan never ratified the 1933 
treaty, which explicitly prohibited rounding up women and forcing them 
to become prostitutes, even with the woman’s consent, it could technically 
claim that it had broken no international laws.217  However, given the 
already existing widespread international consensus regarding the 
prohibition, embodied in treaties, it could be argued that Japan flagrantly 
violated an effectively existing international custom.218 
 Ultimately, the Japanese military was just as guilty as the Nazis 
were of “crimes against humanity”—defined by the Nuremberg IMT as 
“murders, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war,” 
as well as “persecutions on political or racial grounds.”219  However, at the 
Tokyo IMT, “not even one person was tried for crimes against 
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humanity.”220  The reasons for why Japan was not prosecuted for its 
sexual enslavement of women in its occupied territories, among other 
crimes, are manifold.  Not only were rape victims reluctant to come 
forward because of shame,221 but also Japan, the Allied powers and even 
other Asian nations colluded, to render these crimes “resolved” through a 
“political solution.” 
 
Eager to attract or maintain Japanese development aid and 
investment, the postwar governments of Asian nations 
colonized or occupied by Japan during the war have often 
been reluctant to press issues of Japan’s responsibilities to 
its victims.  Not only the Japanese but other Asian 
governments as well would just as soon forget, for 
different but complementary reasons, that comfort women 
ever existed.222 
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 Nuancing what appears, from the view of historical distance, to be 
an unproblematic blanket of collusion, Yuma Totani223 argues that “the 
Allied prosecutors—and in particular, the Dutch member—substantiated 
the Japanese commission of various forms of sexual violence including 
sexual slavery, targeted . . . at the Asian female population.”224 Repeatedly, 
Totani points to documentary traces of the prosecution’s attention (or at 
least non-dismissal) of sexual violence perpetrated against Asian women.  
For example, “rape and other acts of physical abuse” were among the 
fifteen general patterns of Japanese war crimes appended to the 
indictment; 225  in addition, during the trial, the prosecutors supplied 
additional evidence about other types of war crimes, implied in but not 
specifically identified in the indictment, such as civilian-targeted atrocities, 
including “deportation and use of numerous Asian civilians as slave 
laborers.”226   Nevertheless, Totani does point out that this extensive 
documentation did not cover the Korean and Taiwanese comfort women, 
but instead focused on “military sexual slavery targeted to women of 
enemy nationalities, such as Chinese, Dutch, Indonesian and Vietnamese 
women.”227  Although she does not develop the idea, Totani points to the 
liminal status of Koreans and Taiwanese—from the perspective of the 
Allied forces, they were both victims (forced to serve the Japanese) and 
victimizers (who had assisted in Japan’s aggression and atrocities),228 
unlike the other Asian nationalities, who were clearly regarded as 
“enemies” of Japan.  Ultimately she arrives at the same conclusion: “As 
history shows, Allied prosecutors did not explore th[e] possibility [of 
prosecuting this systematic sexualized violence against women in the 
Japanese colonies] and ultimately failed to hold Japanese leaders 
accountable for organized sexual slavery.”  She concurs that “this 
unfortunate omission can be validly considered as one major historical 
shortcoming of the Tokyo Trial.”229 
                                                 
223 Elizabeth Borgwardt argues that a modern treatment of the Tokyo IMT must take into 
account Boister & Cryer’s The Tokyo International Military Tribunal (2008) and Totani’s 
The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (2008) or it runs the risk of being dismissed by scholars as 
not being properly up to date.  See Elizabeth Borgwardt, Étienne Jaudel, Le procès de 
Tokyo:  Un Nuremberg oublié, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 306, 307 (2011) (book review). 
224 YUMA TOTANI, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 179 (2008). 
225 Id. at 108. 
226 Id. at 109. 
227 Id. at 14. 
228 Id. at 13. 
229 Id. at 14. 
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V. THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CASE OF THE COMFORT 
WOMEN: ATTEMPTING TO GO BEYOND FORGETTING 
Although this article focused initially on the historical, political, 
and legal dimensions of the papering over of Japan’s wartime crimes of 
violence against women, cultural dimensions are also part of the picture.  
For example, Japanese soldiers widely believed that sex before battle 
provided a charm against injury.230  Thus, soldiers wore amulets made 
from the pubic hairs or from the possessions of comfort women.231  
Conversely, sexual deprivation was believed to make one accident-prone, 
probably because of the lack of stress-relief, given the savage training the 
Japanese military underwent.232  And since an army’s strength is no 
greater than that of its weakest link, there was a great deal of pressure for 
soldiers to visit comfort stations; men who resisted were forced by their 
own comrades.233  The soldiers’ favorite victims were hua gu niang234—
young girls—because virgins were supposed to provide particularly potent 
protection.  Yet as the Nanking Massacre shows, all women (and even 
men) were targeted for rape:  women in their eighties were not spared, 
pregnant women about to go into labor were violated and their fetuses 
slashed from their wombs for amusement, preteen girls had their vaginas 
slashed to rape them more effectively, and fathers and husbands were 
forced to witness the rapes of their kin before being forced to rape them as 
well and then finally killed. 235   As one Japanese psychiatrist, First 
Lieutenant Hayao Torao noted, in his report on “Phenomena Particular to 
the Battlefield and Policies Toward Them,” and in specific on “Sexual 
Desire and Rape”:  “Because the idea that [soldiers] are free to do things 
to enemy women that would never be permitted at home is extremely 
widely held, when they see young Chinese women, they are drawn to 
them as if possessed.”236 
 Of course, a phenomenon as complex as the Japanese comfort 
stations is not reducible to a simple excuse for unmitigated “Japan 
bashing.”  For example, the Japanese simply exploited pre-existing gender 
and class discrimination within Korean society to target young, poor 
women.237  Nor were all relationships between the Japanese soldiers and 
their “girl army” necessarily completely devoid of tenderness, or 
                                                 
230 HICKS, supra note 186, at 32. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 33. 
233 Id. 
234 CHANG, supra note 1, at 90. 
235 Id. at 91–96. 
236 YOSHIAKI, supra note 189, at 67. 
237 Id. at 5. 
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sometimes even real concern.238  And the Japanese were not unique, in 
their use of prostitution, as a way to relieve the psychological pressures of 
war and strengthen “troop morale.”239 
 As the rape centers set up by Serbian forces during the 
Yugoslavian civil war demonstrate, rape as a military weapon and as a 
means of subjugation remains viable and is not a World War II relic.  
Although the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and for Rwanda have successfully indicted numerous individuals on 
charges of torture and genocide for crimes that entail sexual violence 
against women, and the statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
clearly outline rape and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity, these 
courts have jurisdiction only over crimes post-dating the Rome Treaty’s 
signing in July 1998.240  Former comfort women, and other victims of 
imperial Japan, therefore have no international legal recourse against their 
victimizers or against the Japanese government, 241  given Japan’s 
recalcitrant denial of any wrongdoing save for a public apology, issued in 
July 1992.242  Although comfort stations’ survivors have engaged in an 
activism that has raised an awareness concerning systematic rape and 
sexual slavery during armed conflict,243 these former comfort women 
“have yet to receive a yen of compensation from the Japanese 
government.”244  Particularly given the virulent racism with which the 
                                                 
238 For example, there are stories of Japanese soldiers falling in love with, and trying to 
protect, comfort women, sometimes even planning to marry them after the war.  HICKS, 
supra note 186, at 80. 
239 The Roman Empire had a system of prostitution that resembled that used by the 
Japanese Imperial Army; similarly, the sixteenth century Spanish Duke of Alva’s army, 
when invading the Netherlands with an armada, was accompanied by “400 mounted 
whores and 800 on foot.”  Id. at 29. 
240 Id. at 19. 
241 See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of an Alien 
Torts Statute action against Japan litigated by fifteen former comfort women from China, 
the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, because of the possible adverse effect on U.S. 
foreign relations with Japan, China, and Korea).  See also HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1213–15 (3d ed. 2008) (1996). 
242 Id. at 264. 
243 See, e.g., Contemporary Forms of Slavery:  Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on 
Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, 50th 
Sess., ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998) (by Gay J. McDougall, 
Special Rapporteur), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/3d25270b5fa3ea998025665f0032f220 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (remarking in a United Nations report that comfort women’s 
activism provided a “significant impetus” for the commissioning of the report, and 
advocating that systematic sexual violence against women be prosecuted as a crime against 
humanity). 
244 HICKS, supra note 186, at 271. 
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Japanese were portrayed during World War II,245 it is surprising how 
easily that collective animosity became effaced, replaced by a diplomatic 
final solution, dressed in legal trappings.  Although forgetting is often part 
of the process of working through trauma, in the case of the Tokyo IMT, 
an artificially imposed collective amnesia simply worked, ironically, to 
generate even more complex mechanisms of denial and guilt, in the 
Japanese, and thus, as a corollary, a problematic heritage of shame and 
denunciation, for the Tokyo IMT.246 
VI. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS MILITARY STRATEGY AND 
CULTURAL MYTH: THE EVOLUTION OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
WARS 
Anne Llewelyn Barstow uses statistics to frame a contrastive 
analysis of the casualties of war during World War I, to wars that followed 
in its wake.  “[I]n World War I, the ratio of military personnel killed to 
civilians killed was 8:1; in World War II it was 1:1; in the many smaller 
wars since 1945, the ratio has been 1:8.  This means that the victims of 
wars have changed:  the great majority being civilians, they are now 
mainly women, children, and the elderly.”247  A crucial strategy in these 
new wars is control over women’s sexuality and reproductive ability.248  
There are four ways in which women are particularly targeted, within the 
context of contemporary military campaigns. 
The first is illustrated in the case of the Korean, Taiwanese and 
Japanese comfort women.  Here, women are kidnapped, held hostage, 
gang-raped, and forced into prostitution in rape camps and detention 
camps.249  Although the horrifying heritage of Japan’s comfort stations 
should have spurred the international community to condemn it as a crime 
against humanity, it was left unpunished by the Tokyo IMT; 250  the 
practice has been more recently resurrected in the extensive crimes of 
sexual abuse and rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina.251   The cultural myth 
                                                 
245 For example, the Western Allies frequently described the Japanese as “subhuman,” 
often portraying them as “apes and vermin.”  JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY:  
RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 9 (1986). 
246 See Havel, supra note 102, at 648 (stating that collective amnesia is also a problem with 
regard to the Holocaust and Nuremberg trials). 
247 Anne Llewelyn Barstow, Introduction to WAR’S DIRTY SECRET:  RAPE, PROSTITUTION, 
AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN 3 (Anne Llewelyn Barstow ed., 2000).  
248 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide and Women’s Human Rights in ARE WOMEN 
HUMAN?  AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 180, 181 (2006). 
249 HICKS, supra note 186, at 17. 
250 YOSHIAKI, supra note 189, at 162. 
251 See Contemporary Forms of Slavery, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Hum. 
Rts., Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, 47th Sess., 
¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/38 (July 13, 1995) (by Linda Chavez), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.1995.38.En (last 
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behind this strategy is that men, unless they are allowed to rape within 
secure conditions, will engage in dangerous raping sprees, or 
surreptitiously sneak off to brothels, engaging in dangerous sex with 
infected prostitutes.252  Iris Chang notes that the Japanese high command 
organized the vast network of comfort stations, after the scandal of the 
Rape of Nanking, to “prevent further mass rape of conquered populations 
with the ensuing world condemnation and control the spread of venereal 
disease through the troops as well.”253 
Second, rather than a “spontaneous” release, rape is a “strategic” 
and systematic endeavor, a military tactic planned and authorized by 
higher authorities to serve two purposes:  (i) to enhance male bonding, 
thus enabling them to become better killing machines,254  and (ii) to 
humiliate and demoralize the enemy through particular cruelty to the 
women, seen as “property” of enemy men.255   Once again, we see 
elements of these in the Japanese war crimes of sexual abuse, especially in 
the Rape of Nanking,256 where the transformation of “normal” young men 
into killing machines practically inured them from guilt and granted them 
immense power in dehumanizing their prey.  As Azuma Shiro, a former 
Japanese soldier remarked, “[p]erhaps when we were raping her we 
looked at her as a woman . . . but when we killed her, we just thought of 
her as something like a pig.”257 Similarly, Rwandan Hutu genocidaires, 
inverting European racialized mythology, dubbed Tutsis “cockroaches” 
and their women “serpents.”258   The Tutsi women were particularly 
targeted for violent attack because of their “beauty” (i.e., “Europeanized” 
features). 
 
                                                                                                               
visited Dec. 29, 2011) (reporting to the United Nations on large-scale rape by Serbian 
military forces).  Scholars have attempted to define and distinguish the various categories 
of sexual crime:  “Rape denotes vaginal, oral, or anal sexual intercourse without the 
consent of one of the people involved.  Sexual assault is a broader term, which includes 
rape and other forced or coerced sexual acts, as well as mutilation of the genitals.  Sexual 
violence is the most general term, used to describe any kind of violence carried out through 
sexual means or by targeting sexuality.”  M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & MARCIA MCCORMICK, 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 3 (1996). 
252 JIN SUNG CHUNG, ILL BON KUK WE AN BU JUNG CHACK EUI HYUNG SUNG KWA 
BYUNWHA [THE FORMATION AND CHANGE OF COMFORT WOMEN POLICY IN JAPANESE 
HISTORY] 1–2 (1990). 
253 Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking in WAR’S DIRTY SECRET:  RAPE, PROSTITUTION, AND 
OTHER CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN 46 (Anne Llewelyn Barstow ed., 2000).  
254 HICKS, supra note 186, at 29. 
255 Susan Brownmiller, Making Female Bodies the Battlefield in MASS RAPE:  THE WAR 
AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 181 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994). 
256 CHANG, supra note 1, at 49–50. 
257 Id. at 48. 
258  Laura Flanders, Rwanda’s Living Casualties in MASS RAPE:  THE WAR AGAINST 
WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 97 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994). 
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Stereotypes portrayed Tutsi women as arrogant and 
deceptive—and sexually special.  Fetishized parts of the 
Tutsi’s supposedly “European” physiology were singled 
out for mutilation:  noses, necks, fingers—as well as 
genitals.  Survivors murmur that their rapists wanted to 
“see what Tutsis look like inside.”259 
 
Third, both Serbian commanders 260  and Rwandan political 
leaders261 have added, in addition to rape and torture, forced and deliberate 
impregnation as a cruel innovation.  Specifically, in relation to the case of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.N. Commission of Experts concluded that 
“[t]he practices of ‘ethnic cleansing’ . . . sexual assault and rape . . . have 
been carried out . . . so systematically that they strongly appear to be the 
product of a policy.” 262   Subsequently, the U.N. General Assembly 
asserted even more strongly that they were “[c]onvinced that this heinous 
practice [rape and violence against women] constitutes a deliberate 
weapon of war in fulfilling the policy of ethnic cleansing carried out by 
Serbia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and . . . that the abhorrent policy of 
ethnic cleansing was a form of genocide.263  Sexual crimes of violence are 
used to nation-build, by forcing dispersal of the racially undesired group.  
“Rapes spread fear and induce the flight of refugees; rapes humiliate, 
                                                 
259 Id. 
260 Catherine MacKinnon remarks on the inhumanity of filming “[t]his campaign of 
expansion through ethnic extermination [that] has included rape, forcible impregnation, 
torture, and murder of Muslim and Croatian women, ‘for Serbia.’”  Catherine A. 
MacKinnon, Turning Rape into Pornography:  Postmodern Genocide in MASS RAPE:  THE 
WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 73 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994). 
261 Laura Flanders states:  “The number of pregnancies said to be caused by force suggest 
that so-called genocidaires raped 250,000 to 500,000 women and girls in less than one 
hundred days.”  Flanders, supra note 258, at 96. 
262 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), transmitted by letter dated May 27, 1994 from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, ¶ 313; see also 
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993). 
263 G.A. Res. 49/205, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/205 (Mar. 6, 1995).  See also Further 
Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including 
the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission:  Alternative 
Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System for Improving the 
Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms:  Preliminary Report 
Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and 
Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in Accordance with Commission on Human 
Rights Resolution 1994/45, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., 
¶ 268, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (Nov. 22, 1994) (by Radhika Coomaraswamy), 
available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/75ccfd797b0712d08025670b005c9a7d 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2011). 
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demoralize, and destroy not only the victim but also her family and 
community; and rapes stifle any wish to return.”264 
 Yet genocidal rape as tied up with forced impregnation has its 
origins in an even more insidious cultural myth—one even more 
dangerous in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina because even the women—
raped or not—Serbian, Moslem or Christian, believed in it.  Not only were 
raped women shunned (and rendered ashamed and guilty) because of the 
loss of their virginity. 265   Even more devastatingly, if they were 
impregnated, because the “thing[s] inside”266 their wombs had the paternal 
heritage of the enemy, the babies were therefore regarded as of the same 
“race” as the rapist. 267   Such a cultural myth stubbornly refused to 
acknowledge the woman’s biological contribution to the creation of a 
child, and reduced her, even more, to a vilified, passive vessel of the 
enemy’s sperm.  Beverly Allen succinctly analyzes the central kernel of 
this masculinist and racist myth:  “Serb ‘ethnic cleansing’ by means of 
rape, enforced pregnancy, and childbirth is based on the uninformed, 
hallucinatory fantasy of ultranationalists whose salient characteristic, after 
their violence, is their ignorance.”268 
 Finally, there is one more use of violence against women as a 
strategy of war:  the kidnapping of women to function as “wives” (i.e., 
slaves) for soldiers, as practiced today in Sudan and by rebels in northern 
Uganda.269  In some ways, the comfort women who traveled with the 
Japanese Imperial Army served this, among other, functions as well.270  
An associated practice, of treating human beings as part of the spoils of 
war, is of kidnapping young boys, old enough to work, to be exploited as 
slaves.271 
 Ultimately and ironically, the picture that emerges, in the wake of 
the Tokyo IMT’s failure to prosecute for the crimes of violence against the 
                                                 
264 Alexandra Stiglmayer, The Rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina in MASS RAPE:  THE WAR 
AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 85 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994). 
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comfort women by the Japanese Imperial Army,272 is not a cessation or 
even diminishing of such crimes, but their escalation into even more 
heinous forms.   
The final section of this article reviews the complexities of 
prosecuting rape and other crimes of violence against women within the 
contemporary context of war; nevertheless, it also examines some of the 
ambiguous legal gains, and makes preliminary proposals for how violent 
sexual crimes, such as those inflicted on the comfort women, might be 
explored. 
VII. CONCLUSION: EVALUATING STRATEGIES OF LEGAL REDRESS 
FOR WARTIME CRIMES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
In light of the Rome Statute’s grant of jurisdiction to the ICC to 
prosecute “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution . . . [and] any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity,”273 rape is now viewed as 
a criminal offense both under national and international rules of war.274  
Nevertheless, rape and other forms of sexualized violence remain 
characterized principally as affronts on personal dignity or crimes against 
                                                 
272 Investigations on Class B and C crimes (conventional war crimes and crimes against 
humanity), as opposed to Class A crimes (crimes against peace) were “conducted by the 
United States, Britain, Australia, France, Holland, Philippines, China and the Soviet Union, 
in their own occupied territory in Asia, based on their own laws and jurisdiction.”  
Although these proceedings were plagued by numerous problems, such as the dearth of 
interpreters, wrongful arrests, procedural issues, “[m]ore than 55,000 individuals were 
taken into custody and 5,700 faced trial as Class B and C criminals.  A total of 984 were 
sentenced to death, 475 to life imprisonment and 2,944 to limited prison sentences,” not 
counting trials by the Soviet Union, which remain uncounted.  FUTAMURA, supra note 17, 
at 75.  However, as Totani pointed out, in relation to military sexual slavery the 
prosecution focused on gender violence against women of enemy nationalities, such as 
Chinese, Dutch, Indonesian, and Vietnamese women, not colonial subjects, such as Korean 
and Taiwanese women.  TOTANI, supra note 224, at 14. 
273 Id. at 157. 
274 See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
art. 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II] (protecting the “person 
[and] honour” of civilians, requiring that they be treated “humanely” and without 
discrimination, and that specifically they be protected against “[v]iolence . . . [o]utrages 
upon personal dignity . . . rape, enforced prostitution . . . [and] [s]lavery”); Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 75–76, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (prohibiting “[o]utrages upon personal dignity . . . 
enforced prostitution . . . [and] rape,” and providing for “special respect” and treatment of 
female prisoners, particularly those pregnant or with infants); Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3(I)(a), (c), 27, 76, 97, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] (prohibiting, 
inter alia, “outrages upon personal dignity” and “attack[s] on [female] honour, in 
particular . . . rape [or] enforced prostitution,” and providing for respectful treatment of 
female detainees and internees). 
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honor275 in contrast with “pure” crimes of violence, such as murder and 
torture.  As a result of this binary distinction (wartime crimes against 
dignity and honor versus wartime crimes of violence), rape is set apart 
from the more violent crimes, and either suffers from masculinist/sexist 
dimensions (rape as a violation of a man’s honor), or causes women to 
internalize these same value systems (as requiring the violation of a 
virgin). Thus, the key issue, in terms of seeking justice in international 
forums for these wartime sexualized crimes of violence, is whether rape 
and other forms of sexualized assault can qualify as what are termed 
“grave breaches,” because such breaches give rise to universal jurisdiction, 
which means: 
 
[E]very nation has an obligation to bring the perpetrators 
to justice through investigating, arresting and prosecuting 
offenders in its own courts or extraditing them to more 
appropriate forums.  The existence of universal 
jurisdiction also provides a legal rationale for trying such 
crimes before an international tribunal and for the 
obligation of states to cooperate.276 
 
Part of the problem, however, is that the Geneva Conventions do not 
itemize rape as a grave breach of international law. 277  Grave breaches are 
defined as “wil[l]ful killing, torture or inhumane treatment” and 
“wil[l]fully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.”278 
                                                 
275 See, e.g., id. at art. 27, ¶ 2 (“Women shall be especially protected against any attack on 
their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent 
assault.”); Protocol II, supra note 274, art. 4. 
276 Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender:  Reconceptualizing Crimes Against Women in 
Time of War in MASS RAPE:  THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 201 
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277 Cf. Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About Torture in TORTURE 307, 308 (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 2004) (“[The] Geneva Conventions were written . . . [to deter] the kind of 
barbaric treatment of civilians that had become so apparent . . . during the Second World 
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would be treated according to a code of dignity if captured . . . [but] would be denied the 
protections of that code if they broke the laws of war and abused civilians themselves.”).  
Although rape might be classified as a form of torture, there is thus a military focus to the 
Conventions that may have led its drafters to overlook detailed protection of female 
civilian.  Cf. John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity:  Defining Torture at Home and 
Abroad in TORTURE 145, 147 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (“[T]he United Nation’s Code 
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials says that the phrase [‘cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’] ‘should be interpreted . . . [broadly] against abuses, 
whether physical or mental.’  International tribunals have given additional content to these 
definitions . . . . Rape . . . [is] torture as well.”). 
278 See Protocol I, supra note 274, art. 85(1), (3), (5) (extending the treatment of “grave 
breaches” in the Geneva Conventions to the Protocol, defining all “grave breaches” as war 
crimes, and specifically forbidding willful attacks on civilians); Geneva Convention IV, 
supra note 274, arts. 146–47 (requiring that contracting parties enact legislation to punish 
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 While military campaigns have evolved to include rape, sexual 
slavery and forced impregnation as forms of torture and genocide, 
international law has not sufficiently evolved to recognize that rape has 
become a form of torture, within the context of war.279  Indeed, despite the 
strong condemnation of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the United Nations’ 
interpretation of whether rape constitutes a grave breach of humanitarian 
law for the purposes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia is ambiguous.  For example, the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission’s sharp condemnation of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia 
characterized the practice as a war crime “in the circumstances,”280 
implying that it is only within such severe circumstances that rape and 
sexual abuse can rise to the level of being a war crime.  Similarly, the 
Declaration of the 1993 World Conference of Human Rights in Vienna, 
despite its strong wording, reserved such censure for “systematic” rape 
and abuse.281 Even though the report declines to recognize rape as a 
“grave breach” giving rise to universal jurisdiction, it does recognize that 
rape and forced prostitution can rise to the level of a “crime against 
humanity.”  For example, Article 2 itemizes as grave breaches “(a) 
wil[l]ful killing; (b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments; (c) wil[l]fully causing great suffering or serious . . . injury to 
body or health.”282 
 Although much still needs to be done to bring international law’s 
characterization of what is a “grave breach” more in conjunction with the 
evolution of contemporary wartime strategies of brutalization, there is 
evidence of some evolution in international law between the CAT 
convention and the Rome Treaty, broadening the reach of this label to 
cover more categories of rape and sexual violence.  In particular, this trend 
is evident in evolving law on sexual torture as developed in some ad hoc 
tribunals established during the Rwandan and Yugoslav conflicts.283  In 
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the Akayesu case, for instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda compared rape to torture, finding that often it “is used for such 
purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, 
punishment, control or destruction of a person,” and observing that “the 
central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical 
description of objects and body parts.”284  The Court noted that rape is not 
defined under international law, but proposed that it should be understood 
as part of a broader class of crimes of “sexual violence,” which would 
include “any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive.”285  The Court notably refused to limit 
its definition of sexual violence to acts involving physical penetration.286  
Subsequently, this groundbreaking recognition—that rape and sexualized 
violence cannot be reduced to mere physical penetration—was reinforced 
by the Muhimana case, which focused on the coercive power of group 
force within the context of genocide.287 
 A further possible strategy for redress for victims of such crimes 
is to characterize them as crimes against humanity, a legal category first 
formulated in the Charter and the Judgment of the Nuremberg Trial.288  
Like grave breaches, crimes of humanity also give rise to universal 
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jurisdiction, but do not rely on treaties, and are immune from the question 
of whether an international conflict or a civil war is involved.289  Indeed, 
both rape and forced prostitution are recognized as “crimes against 
humanity” in the report establishing the statute of the International 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.290  The report defines crimes of 
humanity as “inhumane acts of a very serious nature, such as willing 
killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, 
or religious grounds.”291  While this is an advance, the description of rape 
is thus very similar to its characterization in relation to a “grave breach”—
that it is only when rape is extreme and unusual that is rises to the 
heinousness of being a crime against humanity.  Theoretically, such a 
view makes analytic sense, but in terms of the pragmatic picture of 
contemporary warfare, and its deployment of rape as a strategy of 
persecution, the distinction between a “normal” rape and a “genocidal” 
rape seems moot.292 
 Perhaps the U.S. Alien Tort Act is an additional legal mechanism 
that victims of such sexualized crimes could use, as it has been used in 
relation to apprehending and indicting atrocities related to Rwanda and 
Bosnia.293  The Alien Tort Act gives U.S. district courts jurisdiction over 
suits filed by aliens alleging torts committed anywhere in violation of the 
law of nations.294  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala295 established a three-pronged 
test:  (i) the alien must sue, (ii) the suit must be in tort, and (iii) the tort 
must have been done in violation of the law of nations.296  Ironically, this 
formerly obscure law has been instrumental to seeking justice in the 
Rwandan and Bosnian cases.  And as Susan Shin points out, it was 
theoretically possible that Alien Tort Statute could also have been 
deployed to seek long-delayed justice for the comfort women. 
 
The Korean [and other] comfort women satisfy all three 
prongs [of the Filartiga test], as they are aliens suing the 
Japanese government for the violation of an 
internationally recognized norm of customary 
international law prohibiting military sexual slavery.  
While rape was officially absent from international 
treaties at the close of World War II, the prohibition 
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against slavery was well established at that time, therefore 
granting the comfort women standing under the Act.297 
 
 Unfortunately, in October 2001, a U.S. court dismissed a case 
brought by former Korean comfort women, because it found the Japanese 
government to have immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (FSIA).298  Specifically, the court rejected the argument that Japan’s 
organizing of the comfort stations fell into the commercial activities 
exception of the FSIA as well as the argument that because of a jus cogens 
violation, Japan had lost its immunity.299  Perhaps, as Shin points out, 
individual criminals could still be prosecuted, even if the suit against the 
Japanese government failed.300 
 An alternative to this implicit demand for an immediate and 
conclusive litigated resolution of comfort women’s claims might be found 
in a Truth and Reconciliation Commission—assuming creation of such an 
institution were feasible.  Where such mechanisms have succeeded, as in 
South Africa, they have addressed not only individual claims but at least 
part of the historical trauma and suffering that these typically leave 
behind.301  However, the South African example seemed to have worked 
well largely because of its timing—as a form of transitional justice, when, 
for a brief period, there was popular support for the view that “amnesty 
was the price for allowing a relatively peaceful transition to full 
democracy.” 302   Yet as Martha Minow also points out, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions are “less compatible where the victimized 
group has been expelled or so decimated that it has no nation in which to 
reconcile and rebuild. 303   Moreover, the distance in time separating 
survivors from the events suffered, and likewise, their effective 
geographic distance, for the most part, from the society of the perpetrators, 
mean that “Truth and Conciliation” is still not a viable solution. 
 In contrast, however, Amy Palmer remarks that in Sierra Leone 
the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission . . . has shown the world how 
successful open communication regarding widespread [sexual] 
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victimization can be.”304  In the ten-year war that left 75,000 dead,305 
forced marriage was routinely used to subjugate women of the opposing 
side, who were held hostage and systematically raped.  This was distinct 
from the shorter-term modes of rape common in Rwandan and 
Yugoslavia.306  As Palmer notes, there is a distinction between sexual 
slavery and forced marriage, as the types of “conjugal duties” that the 
“bush wives” were forced to bear were not exclusively sexual, but in some 
ways a bush wife’s forced status as a “wife” was even worse, because of 
the external pressure reinforcing the coercion that she stay with her 
“husband” (especially when there were children from the “marriage”).307  
Like the Sierra Leone “wives” who were branded by their captors, their 
chests carved with the letters “RUF” or “ARC” (which made escape 
harder, as these signs were interpreted as indicating allegiance to the rebel 
cause, making them vulnerable to attacks),308 the comfort women were 
“branded” by their experiences of having been comfort women, often 
unable to reintegrate back into society and sometimes rendered sterile. 
 As the violent Sierra Leonean civil war unfolded, sexual violence, 
perpetrated by various factions, broke out on a massive scale.  
Mysteriously, however, it went almost unreported in the media, as the 
international community attended almost exclusively to the more widely-
reported issue of forced amputation. 309  In addition to falling below the 
radar of the international media and the conscience of the world 
community, the experience of the bush wives of Sierra Leone evokes other 
similarities to the plight of the comfort women.  In both cases, there is the 
use of coercion to make the captured woman a “wife,” or a relatively 
permanent companion—or sometimes, less flatteringly, a type of “war 
supply.”  Bush wives, like the comfort women, also discovered after their 
war had ended that their plight had not, due to the lingering stigma of 
“having been married to a rebel and having assisted in rebel activities,” 
which made return to family and community difficult.310  As a striking 
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indication of this harsh reality, many of the “bush wives” have remained 
together with their captors even to the present day.311 
 In this context of such stigma, trauma and loss, Palmer provides 
an intriguing account of how at least some victims were able to achieve 
legal redress through the mechanism of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.312  In addition, Palmer provides a striking account of how 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission facilitated exchanges between 
victims and perpetrators that allowed “genuine healing and reconciliation” 
to occur.313  Most importantly to this discussion about ways of achieving 
legal redress, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
recognized not only sexual slavery but also forced marriage as a crime 
against humanity.314  Though several key defendants were acquitted of this 
charge, Palmer notes that the Court has set an “important precedent for 
future prosecution of gender-based crimes in both ad hoc tribunals and the 
permanent ICC.”315 
 As international human rights law continues to develop, even the 
comfort women or their heirs may eventually attain some form of legal 
redress.  Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which covers crimes against 
humanity—and which delineates the reach of the ICC’s prosecutorial 
jurisdiction in such cases—clearly covers crimes of forced marriage, and 
authorizes prosecution for “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity.”316  In light of more recent conflicts and 
continuing humanitarian violations, perhaps the real heritage of the 
comfort women is less a history of collective amnesia than a history of 
attempting to work through the trauma of sexual slavery—a process that 
continues today.  Such a process is far from simple because “working 
through” trauma (an act of analysis that produces interpretations allowing 
for responsible control) cannot be sharply delineated from its pathological 
twin of “acting out” trauma, or repetitively rehearsing it.317  But it is a 
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process we must continually challenge ourselves to undertake lest we 
forget not only our history but our humanity. 
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